24 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for Your Visit to the

Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) on

25 April

1. Following up on your 17 April letter to commenting on the SWS's first Monthly Report, several of us on 21 April to met with and review its main points. Most of the discussion revolved around our concern that the SWS was interpreting its charter somewhat too broadly. We suggested that some issues addressed in the SWS Monthly Report either were only marginally related to strategic warning or were reported in such a way that their relevance to strategic warning was not apparent. We suggest you reemphasize the proposition that, while the SWS will necessarily monitor a wide variety of developing situations,

--articles in the Monthly Report, the Alert List or other SWS publications should be drafted in such a way as to make explicit to the reader the relevance of the issue to strategic warning as defined in DCID 1/5. *

2. Also discussed briefly was the relationship between SWS produces and Alert Memoranda and the desirability of effective contact between the SWS and the NIOs. We suggest you might ask Faurer and Hanrahan

--how does the SWS view its relationship to the NIO structure on the warning process; is there anything I (the DCI) should do to ensure effective coordination between the two?

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^{*}DCID 1/5 states: "Strategic warning is defined as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC, or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the U.S."

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25X1	3. Some elements of the community are urging the SWS to prepare daily notes similar to the former National Indications Center (NIC) Notes. and are still considering this possibility but tend to oppose it on the grounds that it would be a relatively heavy burden on the staff and reduce the time available for its primary (analytical) function. We agree and suggest you	25X1
	*-discourage the publication by the SWS of any kind of daily product.	
25X1	4. Faurer and are attempting to devise an effective means (graphically or textually) of conveying a "temperature reading" of strategic warning indicators, perhaps in the Monthly Report or through some other medium. We believe this idea has merit and suggest you	
	encourage the SWS to develop a technique for conveying periodic changes in the level of strategic threat to the US.	
	Samuel V. Wilson Lieutenant General, USA D/DCI/IC	25X1
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